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Your consciences bear me witness, that while I had opportunity, 
I have not ceased to warn you, and set before you your danger. 
I have studied to represent the misery and necessity of your 
circumstances, in the clearest manner possible. I have tried 
all ways, that I could think of, tending to awaken your con-
sciences, and make you sensible of the necessity of your im-
proving your time and being speedy in fleeing from the wrath to 
come, and thorough in the use of means for your escape and 
safety. I have diligently endeavored to find out and use, the 
most powerful motives to persuade you to take care for your own 
welfare and salvation. I have not only endeavored to awaken 
you, that you might be moved with fear, but I have used my ut-
most endeavors to win you: I have sought out acceptable words. 
That if possible, I might prevail upon you to forsake sin, and 
turn to God, and accept of Christ as your Saviour and Lord. 
(Jonathan Edwards,. "Farewell Sermon," ed. Vergilius Ferm, 
(New York: Library Publishers, 1953), p. 471.) 
1 
I. THE CONTEXT 
Who was Johathan Edwards? That this is a difficult question is 
revealed in many ways. In his own time he was at the center of debate 
and controversy, meeting opponents whichever way he turned. Allies in 
the debate over one issue often became enemies on other issues. 
Today, the controversy still goes on. Although critics agree on the 
power ofEdwards' intellect, they are in disagreement about the uses to 
which he put it and what he achieved with it, and this disagreement 
centers on the place of Enlightenment thought in Edwards' theological 
and philosophical systems. 
Some critics see Edwards as the ultimate Calvinist, the brilliant, 
though largely unoriginal, defender of a lost theological cause. 
Vergilius Ferm sees him as "a prisoner of a set of alleged fundamental 
truths" whose thought was circumscribed by the rigid Calvinist doctrine 
that held his allegiance. 1 Alfred 0. Aldridge believes that Edwards 
rose to his position of dominance among American theologians only 
because of the Calvinism that gave his thought direction and focus. 2 
Edwards' works are, for Aldridge, the culmination of the systematic 
presentation of Calvinism and, in fact, Calvinism's last stand; yet 
Aldridge does not view his defense as creative: "Edwards' great talent 
was a destructive one; he demolished all the conventional arguments for 
free will and exposed the fallacies in most of the current systems of 
ethics[;] but he contributed little on the positive side."3 Perry Miller 
also sees Edwards' philosophical works as attacks that destroyed his 
2 
opponents' systems without a constructive explication of his own system. 4 
Clarence Faust and Thomas Johnson, though their judgments are less 
negatively phrased, believe Edwards is "a representative product, both 
in background and temperament, of the elements of spiritual enlightenment 
for which all good Puritans yearned with a consuming ardor."5 Yet is 
Edwards only the "complete" Calvinist? 
Some criticsbelievethat Edwards' thought is both brilliant and 
original, that his Calvinism, though limiting, is not the limit. For 
them Edwards' attempts to redefine and revitalize Calvinism through the 
science and philosophy of the Enlightenment is, in a large measure, 
successful. Miller believes that Edwards, though he speaks "from a 
primitive religious conception . . . hopelessly out of touch with even 
his own day," at the same time speaks "from an insight into science and 
technology so much ahead of his time that our own can hardly be said to 
have caught up with him."6 Frankena, in his foreward to True Virtue, 
writes that Edwards "meant to propose an ethical theory that was 
consistent with Calvinism, but he meant to establish it on empirical and 
rational grounds," an effort that was a bold and independent one. 7 
Heimert, too, sees his reconstruction of Calvinist philosophy as an 
outgrowth of the new science: "Edwards divested Calvinism of the 
language and conceptual apparatus of the 'covenant theology' and 
portrayed man's salvation (and the redemption of mankind) as part of 
the divinely-ordered sequence and 'attractions' of the universe," a 
reconstruction inspired by the Newtonian physics. 8 These critics see 
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Edwards as striving to incorporate Enlightenment thought into the 
threatened Calvinism of his day, but to what extent was he successful 
in striking a balance between the two? 
Other critics believe that Edwards' thought went completely beyond 
the Calvinism he defended. For Gail Parker, Edwards' philosophy, 
[by] insisting on a spontaneous flow between men's inner princi-
ples and their actions so that their spiritual state was con-
stantly on trial and renewed, ... had explicitly rejected the 
rhetoric and do-good morality of a degenerate Puritanism[;) ... 
his conception of experiential religion [was based] on a psychology 
that denied either the possibility of getting outside oneself or 
of hold~ng one's principles aloof from the ambiguities of action 
The Calvinist terminology Edwards redefined and the Lockean 
terminology he employed becomes, for critics such as Parker, indicative 
of an Edwardean philosophy that America did not and cannot escape. 
Though.critics disagree in their analysis of the degree to which 
Enlightenment thought influenced Edwards' theological writings, very 
little critical work has been done on how his thought, and the 
influences on it, are revealed in his ministry. There has, in fact, 
been a strong tendency to view Edwards the theologian separately from 
Edwa'rds the minister. Yet his writings in defense of the Great Awakening 
and his treatises in defense of Calvinist doctrine can also be read as 
defenses of his ministry, since in the end, theology's primary purpose 
is to aid ministers and congregations in theirpursuit of valid religious 
experience. The Enlightenment thinkers had redefined the nature of man 
and of experience, redefinitions that Edwards accepted as valid. Yet he 
also believed the Calvinist view that man was inherently corrupt and 
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incapable of attaining the highest good without God's intervention in his 
life. Were these views utterly disparate, or could they work together 
in an effective ministry? Within his lifetime, Edwards faced challenges 
both of these views and of the ministry he.based on them. In his 
answers to these challenges, Edwards incorporated both Enlightenment 
thought such as Locke's and Calvinist thought. He described a minis-
terial practice that utilized Locke's theory of language and Calvinistic 
belief in reason and sound doctrine as means to move man to religious 
experience. He described a conversion process that relied both on 
Locke's view of experience and on the Calvinist belief in the role of 
God's grace in religious experience. And he defined a view of man that 
incorporated both Locke's psychology of learning and experience and the 
Calvinist view of depraved man. 
"How," asked Alfred Aldridge in his critical study of Jonathan 
Edwards, "can a minister logically teach that a man's salvation or damna-
tion has been irrevocably ordered from before the creation of the world 
and still appeal to him to change his way of life in order to accept the 
Christian plan of salvation?" 10 It is a question Edwards would have 
recognized, for within it were the challenges he confronted in his own 
day. Taken in philosophical terms, it was a question generated by 
Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke when they challenged the old 
notions about the nature of man and of the world and brought man to a 
re-examination of himself and his earthly and his spiritual experience. 
Taken in theological terms, it was the question generated by Calvinist 
thinkers as they re-examined and altered the fundamental doctrines of 
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Calvinism. In essence, Aldridge's question, with its implied accusation 
of a dichotomy within Calvinist thought and practice, had, in Edwards' 
own day, impelled him to an examination and defense of that thought and 
practice. Could the Calvinist and the Enlightenment views of the nature 
of man and his experience in the world be integrated? And, if so, in a 
Calvinist world where man's own efforts were of no avail in gaining 
salvation, how could he be convinced that he must still strive for it? 
The New England of Edwards' day was in the process of a change that 
challenged the very foundations of the Calvinism that had dominated it 
for so long. As long as life had been a succession of hardships, the 
grim Calvinist view of the world and man's experience in it had seemed 
believable. But as the frontier life gradually grew easier, the rigid 
emotional and intellectual control that Calvinism had exercised began to 
weaken. The Puritans, as they established their religion and way of 
life in New England, had built on a contradictory base. Control had 
been exercised largely by the ministry, but the Puritan requirement that 
church members publicly profess conversion experiences ignored the 
church's and the minister's roles as intermediaries between God and man. 
God spoke directly to man on matters of conversion, could he not do so 
on other matters as well? 
Calvinism had retained the belief in learning that was so much a 
part of the age, but that learning included the classics of the pagan 
world, as well as the Christian writings of the medieval church, the 
Reformation, and the Renaissance. Yet if pagan widsom was to be accepted 
as valid, and if it had been attained without divine grace, then it 
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amounted to a confession that 
[the Puritans] did not believe man was hopelessly corrupt or too 
abysmally sinful. Every such passage was by implication an 
acknowledgment that natural reason had its place in the scheme 
of things ... that natural man, employing reason, was not 
quite a contemptible worm.ll 
In view of the Calvinist doctrine of the total depravity of man, this 
was a large confession, though an unconscious one. 
Acceptance of new scientific discoveries was also within the 
Puritan tradition, which saw no reason for science and reason to 
conflict, but acceptance was limited to the demonstrable facts. Puritan 
thinkers accepted the new science as containing nothing that would 
detract from God, but most of them took no part either in advancing the 
new theories or in retarding them. 
These forces within Calvinism, operating in the atmosphere created 
by the Enlightenment's emphasis on reason, had generated both the 
internal changes and the external attacks that threatened Calvinist 
orthodoxy. C. C. Goen, editor of the Yale edition of Edwards' writings 
on the Great Awakening, estimates that "for at least half a century the 
whole basis for church life in New England had been shifting imperceptibly 
to human effort and moral striving,"12 challenging the doctrines that had 
stressed man's moral incapacity to achieve salvation without divine 
grace. The doctrine of conversion had been challenged by the appearance 
and acceptance of the Half-Way Covenant, which had made church membership 
available to all people of good reputation. On the surface New England 
kept to the tradition enough to protest, in dilatory fashion, against 
such deviations as Arminianism, but even the ministry had grown away 
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from rigid interpretation and enforcement of dogma. It was at this 
point that Edwards challenged both the subtle shift of orthodoxy and 
the open challenges of rationalists, attempting to reawaken men to true 
religious experience, to reinstate that experience as the prerequisite 
of church membership and its privileges, and to reinstate dogma in its 
full meaning. He would find that his defense had placed him in "a 
no-man's land between 'two opposing armies.' As a consequence .. 
[his defense] drew fire from both sides." 13 On the one side he was 
rejected by those Calvinists who were unwilling truly to live and 
experience their religion to the full, on the other, by those who 
believed the new learning could lead only to dismissal of doctrines that 
denied the worth and dignity of man. Ironically, Edwards' opponents 
would argue their position from the scholastic psychology of the previous 
age. And Edwards would employ a Lockean psychology with which, as Alan 
Heimert says, "nothing the ["Old Lights"] had learned at Harvard had 
14 prepared them to cope." 
If the Enlightenment, by generating and maintaining an atmosphere 
open to speculation and change, had encouraged the challenges of the 
Calvinism Edwards was impelled to defend, it also provided him with both 
the materials and the method to meet that challenge. Accepting Locke's 
theories as scientific descriptions of the operations of mind, he based 
his examination of the means through which, and the ends to which, man 
experienced the Calvinist world on Locke's "full account of the ways 
whereby [men's] understanding attain [their] notions," believing with 
Locke "that the one legitimate field of both speculation and worship 
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[was] the content of the human mind. " 15 Yet that content was open to 
view only as it was communicated through language, and the relationship 
between language and reality was always precarious. There was "the 
ever-present danger of language getting cut off from reality and 
[ h . ] h d b 1 d " 16 experience w ~ch a ecome an actua ity in his own ay. The moral 
and spiritual problems Calvinism faced were, in Edwards' view, created 
by the divorce of words from their true meaning. As language became 
more abstract, it allowed more room for misunderstandings and errors, 
since each man's use of language involved personal and private defini-
tions of words, and it lost its ability to recall specific experiences 
and ideas to mind. But Locke's theory of language offered both the means 
to destroy the false structures of reason abstract language had created 
and the means to move man to real experience. If words could be 
reattached to original definitions, if definitions could be purged of 
extraneous meanings, then language could once again convey ideas clearly. 
If language could return to the concrete meanings it had held in earlier 
times, then it could excite sensations by recalling experiences to the 
mind. Only then could it affect the hearer powerfully enough with the 
force of ideas. And Edwards believed that language, clarified in this 
manner, could be an effective tool in the ministry. 
If the way to make living impressions on the minds of men [was] 
through the senses, did it not follow that a Christian oratory 
which would put aside those vague and insignificant forms of 
speech, all those abuses of language that [had] passed for 
science, which would ... 'break in upon the sanctuary of 
vanity and ignorance,' which would use words as God [used] 
objects, to force sensation and the ideas annexed to them into 
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men's minds through the only channel ideas can be carried to 
them, through the senses--would such an oratory not force upon 
New England the awakening that three generations of prophets 
had called for in vain. 17 
To establish and defend that oratory, Edwards had first to disprove the 
foundations of his opponents' arguments by an appeal to a radical and 
18 foreign psychology few of them had grasped. Ironically, his opponents, 
speaking from a science that had separated the operations of the human 
mind into a system of meshing gears, were considered the humanistic and 
liberal theologians; and Edwards, speaking from the contemporary, 
dynamic science that had reunified man, was considered the reactionary. 
In the confrontation, Edwards redefined the nature of man and his 
experience, for the ultimate issue was the meaning of man's endeavors 
as a moral agent in a moral universe. 
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I I. OF MAN AND MEANS 
Although Edwards had challenged the drift away from traditional 
Calvinist orthodoxy in early sermons, notably the election sermon in 
Boston in 1731, the occasion of his first open confrontation with the 
"Old Lights," as the opponents of the revivals came to be called, was 
the outbreak of emotional religion known as the Great Awakening. 
Edwards' own conversion had been a deeply emotional and inward experi-
ence, and it led him to reject the expressions of religion as mere 
formalities that had become dominant in his time. He made it his mission 
to awaken the sense of sin in the Puritans who were turning away from 
the deeper meanings of their religion, who were religious only in 
external appearance and not in belief. His sense of mission eventually 
led him into emotional and evangelical preaching that identified him with 
the revival. 
The Great Awakening itself was the result of several factors. North-
hampton, under Edwards' grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, had had several 
awakenings during his tenure as minister, so there, at least, the pat-
tern was strong. Stoddard had also been largely ·responsible for the 
Half-Way Covenant that had brought large numbers of the unconverted into 
the church, people who were, for the most part, in doubt concerning the 
state of their souls. When itinerant evangelists such as George White-
field and Gilbert Tennant preached throughout the area, conditions were 
present for the mass conversions that soon occurred. Affectional preach-
ing, gaining adherents as the.revival grew, deliberately sought the 
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emotional responses of the congregations. To the Puritan traditionalists, 
however, the outbreak of revival preaching, emphasizing emotionalism over 
intellectualism, seemed a complete break with Puritan tradition. Strong 
opposition soon developed. Charles Chauncy, a leading Boston minister 
of the times and chief spokesman for the "Old Lights," warned that 
Reasonable beings are not to be guided by Passion or Affection, 
though the Object of it should be GOD, and the Things of another 
World; They need, even in this Case, to be under the Government 
of the well instructed Judgment; Nay, when Men's Passions are 
raised to an extraordinary Height, if they have not, at the same 
Time, a due Balance of Light and Knowledge in their Minds, they 
are so far from being in a more desirable state on this Account, 
that they are in circumstances of extreme Hazard.l9 
Although the "Old Lights" did not openly reject the Calvinist doctrine 
of justification by faith alone, their reliance on reason and time to 
bring man to salvation implied at least a partial belief in justifica-
tion by works. They did not have the sense of urgency about salvation 
that impelled Edwards and the revivalists to affectional preaching. 
To the revivalists, the reasonable religion of the "Old Lights" seemed 
a coldly unconvincing one that could not "speak living sense unto 
20 
souls." The revivalists did not believe men could bring about their 
own salvation. Salvation would come in God's good time, if it came at 
all, and their hearers had to be brought to the realization that they 
stood in danger of damnation every minute. One of the foremost 
revivalists, Gilbert Tennant, saw the unconverted ministry as a threat 
to the hopes of their congregations; eventually, he warned such ministers 
to search their own souls for the marks of real conversion, "for no Cause 
[could] produce Effects above its power," or to face the loss of their 
1 . 21 pu p1ts. 
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Whatever benefits the revivals had were soon threatened by the 
excesses into which both ministers and congregations fell. And the "Old 
Lights" were quick to use such excesses as evidence against the validity 
of the revival experience, using the demonstrably false affections as 
proof that all high affections were false. Chauncy warned that if man 
were converted, his new nature would not be contaminated, that "'twas 
a great Mistake to think, that the new Nature, or those Influences that 
produce it, however extraordinary, [were] apt to put Men upon making 
wrong or strange Judgments either of Persons or of Things: They have a 
d .. 22 contrary Ten ency . . . The "Old Lights" were particularly concerned 
about the lay preaching practiced by evangelistic converts and about the 
attempts to establish separate churches, seeing in them a threat to 
church order. And they were openly critical of the excesses demonstrated 
in such bodily manifestations as the crying out, fainting, and convulsing 
that were becoming increasingly prevalent. Surely, the anti-revivalists 
felt, genuine conversion, coming of God's grace, would be free of such 
errors as were contaminating the revival. Surely genuine conversion 
would have its foundation in man's highest faculty, his reason, and not 
in his lowest, his emotions. 
Edwards also became increasingly concerned about the excesses and 
errors that threatened the revival. Chauncy had challenged the affec-
tional base of the revival, and the evangelistic preaching that created 
it, as the tools of the devil to delude men's minds and ensnare their 
souls. The only good to come out of the revival, he felt, had been the 
opportunity it provided for the defense of reason and its 
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re-establishment as the only true basis for religion. Edwards, however, 
saw the errors of the revival as the devil's attempt to bring down a 
true work of God: 
Herein appears that subtility of Satan •••. [K]nowing the greater 
part of the land were not versed in such things, and had not had 
much experience of great religious affections to enable them to 
judge well of them, and distinguish between true and false; then 
he knew [that] by sowing tares amongst the wheat, and mingling 
false affections with the works of God's Spirit [he could] bring 
all religion into disrepute.23 
In Edwards' view, the opponents had been deluded into operating as the 
devil's tools, into propagating a formal and lifeless religion. Once it 
became apparent that many supposed conversions had been false, then 
• . . the devil [saw] it to be for his interest . • . to endeavor 
to his utmost to propagate and establish a persuasion, that all 
affections and sensible emotions of the mind, in things of reli-
gion, are ••• to be avoided and carefully guarded against, as 
things of a pernicious tendency. This ... is the way to bring 
all religion to a mere lifeless formality • . . .24 
Chauncy and the "Old Lights" had erred, Edwards felt, in condemning the 
entire revival because of the errors into which some of its adherents had 
fallen. They had blinded themselves to the very real good demonstrated, 
whatever the imprudences and irregularities, by "a great increase of a 
spirit of seriousness, and sober consideration of the things of the in-
ternal world; •.. a disposition to treat matters of religion with 
1 i d f . 1125 so emn ty, an as matters o great ~mportance. The errors of the 
Awakening were not to be ignored, however, and Edwards undertook an 
i t . f h . Th h d . n· . . h' M k 26 · exam na ~on o t em ~n oug .ts an ~n ~st~ngu~s 1ng ar s. But h~s 
real concern was that the "Old Lights" operated from a very basic mis-
conception about the nature of man and of religious experience. 
----··~·-----
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Chauncy and his supporters followed the scholastic psychology of the 
previous century in assuming that man's reason could and, ideally, should 
operate independently in controlling the other faculties. Therefore they 
could base religion on reason, to the exclusion of all affection. In 
Edwards' view, however, man could not exclude either reason or affection 
from religion without destroying it; for 
[a]s on the one hand, there must be light in the understanding, 
as well as an affected fervent heart; where there is heat with-
out light, there can be nothing divine or heavenly in that 
heart; so on the other hand, where there is a kind of light 
without heat, a head stored with notions and speculations, with 
a cold and unaffected heart, there can be nothing divine in 
that light, that knowledge is no true spiritual knowledge of 
divine things. If the great things of religion are rightly 
understood, they will affect the heart. 27 
Edwards agreed with Locke that reason, operating independently, achieved 
very little in the world, especially in the moral world. Locke had said, 
"knowledge of morality, by mere natural light ... makes but a slow 
progress, and little advance in the world," it being plain, in fact, 
"that human reason unassisted failed man, in its great and proper business 
of morality." 28 Edwards saw his own age as supreme proof of this failure: 
how much has there been of [speculative and doctrinal] knowledge, 
in the Christian world, in this age? Was there ever an age 
wherein strength and penetration of reason, extent of learning, 
exactness of distinction, correctness of style, and clearness of 
expression did so abound? And yet was there ever an age wherein 
there has been so little sense of the evil of sin, so little 
love to God, heavenly-mindedness, and holiness of life, among 
the professors of the true religion?29 
Yet if religion could not rely on reason alone, neither could it operate 
only from affection without degenerating into the enthusiasm which 
Chauncy had accused the revival of encouraging. The affectional preaching 
---------------------------------------- ------------
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of Edwards and the other revivalists had come under heavy attack on this 
charge. Answering the accusation required the refutation of the scholas-
tic psychology, with its fragmenting view of the operations of the human 
mind, a refutation that Edwards undertook in Religious Affections. 30 
If the scholastic conception of man had directed the thinking of 
"Old Lights," it was the Lockean conception that permeated Edwards' 
thought. Locke, in his Essay, had portrayed man as a being created 
without innate ideas, though with natural principles governing the opera-
tions of the mind. He believed the mind gained all ideas through 
experience: 
In that all our knowledge [was] founded; and from that it ulti-
mately [derived] itself. Our observation employed either, about 
external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of 
our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, [was] that 
which [supplied] our understanding with all the materials of 
thinking.31 
These two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection, were the materials 
upon which the mind operated, the two principal operations, also called 
faculties, being "the power of thinking ., called the Understanding, 
and the power of volition • • . , called the Will. " 32 These two faculties 
together reacted to such sensations as pain or pleasure, uneasiness or 
satisfaction, which God in his wisdom attached to the objects of our 
senses, and the ideas and observations of our mind, so that man would not 
"pass his time only in a lazy, lethargic dream." 33 In Locke's view, the 
materials of experience could not be neutral, for if they were, 
we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to 
another; negligence to attention, or motion to rest. And so 
we should neither stir our bodies, nor employ our minds, but 
let our thoughts run adrift, without any direction or 
design • • • • 34 
16 
Man had to take notice of the impressions made on him, for "whatever im-
pressions [were] made on the outward parts, if they [were] not taken 
. f . h. h [ ] . ..35 not1ce o w1t 1n, t ere was no percept1on. Edwards echoed this con-
ception of man in Religious Affections. Han's consciousness was in "the 
mind's perceiving what is in itself--ideas, actions, passions, and every-
36 thing that is there perceptible." The mind had to "feel" in order to 
perceive. For Edwards, as for Locke, man had two faculties, "one • 
by which it [was] capable of perception and speculation ... which [was] 
called the understanding," and another "by which the soul [did] not 
merely perceive and view things, but [was] . inclined to them, or 
disinclined or adverse from them . . . [which] is sometimes called the 
. 1' . ..37 1nc 1nat1on. The inclination, called the will in its determination 
of actions, kept the soul from operating as an "indifferent unaffected 
38 
spectator." And because he believed in this view of man, Edwards was 
able to assert not only that affections could co-exist with reason, in 
religious experience, but that they were indeed necessary, for "nothing 
[was] more manifest in fact, than that the things of religion take hold 
39 
of men's souls, no further than they affect them." Man's nature was 
such that to be unaffected was to be inactive. Both Locke and Edwards 
observed that man's affections were commonly engaged in seeking worldly 
prosperity, that man's strongest efforts were directed to that goal, and 
both noted that such energies would be better directed to seeking assur-
ance of the future world. 40 Where, then, was affection to be better 
employed than in moving man to a concern for his soul? 
17 
Man could not, however, in either Locke's or Edwards' view, stop 
with the affectional experience; otherwise, he stood in danger of becom-
ing an enthusiast. Chauncy and the "Old Lights" had erred in denying 
religion the affectional materials of experience, but they had not erred 
in setting up reason as a judge of that experience. Edwards agreed with 
Locke that "laying by reason, would set up revelation without it [;] 
[w]hereby in effect it takes away both reason and revelation, and sub-
stitutes in the room of them the ungrounded fancies of a man's own 
b . ..41 ra1n • • • • True revelation would enlarge natural reason, not deny 
it, whether that revelation was traditional or original. Locke had dis-
tinguished betweeri original revelation, in which God spoke directly to 
each individual, and traditionalrevelation,which was the written record 
by which man knew of the original revelations made to others, and denied 
that traditional revelation, the written word of God, could engender any 
new simple ideas in man, though its truths could be examined through 
reason. Original revelation, however, could bring man to "that first 
impression which is made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to 
42 
which we cannot set any bounds." In Edwards' view divine grace, as the 
infusion of a new simple idea rather than as a new faculty, was that 
original revelation: 
So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, 
but it is a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a 
new kind of exercise of the same faculty of understanding. So 
that new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense, 
is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature 
of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of 
will. 43 
18 
This new sense did not set up a faculty in opposition to the reason that 
had operated from a natural foundation; instead, it provided reason with 
the spiritual foundation that had been lost in the fall. Locke and 
Edwards viewed conversion as an affectional experience that could, and 
must, be confirmed through the inward intuitions and evidences of the 
mind. "No man," said Locke, "[could], if he would, conform his faith to 
the dictates of another[;] [a]ll the life and power of true religion con-
sists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not 
faith without believing."44 Edwards, too, insisted that man's persuasion 
be "a conviction founded on real evidence," rather than on education and 
h . . f h 45 t e op1n1ons o ot ers. Such evidences must be founded also on in-
tuitive knowledge, since, for both Locke and Edwards, the more immediately 
knowledge was connected to original sensation and reflection, the more 
clearly its truths were perceived. 
Edwards had expounded the psychology of Lockean man to justify the 
thought behind the Great Awakening and to warn against the errors in the 
practice of his fellow revivalists and their adherents, errors he began 
to view as an even greater threat than the "Old Lights." Underlying his 
own practice during the Awakening had been, as Loren Baritz, in his work 
on the Puritan belief in their role as God's chosen people, points out, 
"a highly refined and rationalistic philosophy of emotional religion," 
but the behavior of such preachers as George Whitefield and James 
Davenport "seemed to be nothing but a licentiousness which thrived on the 
odious impact of their bellowing." 46 So while Edwards argued that the 
affectional base of the revival was valid, he also preached and wrote 
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against its excesses, and the revivalists began to feel he had betrayed 
them. Edwards had charged the "Old Lights" with unjustly and unwisely 
condemning all affections. But he also charged that he and his fellow 
revivalists had erred in injudiciously accepting all affections: 
For ..• as we ought not to reject and condemn all affections, 
as though true religion did not at all consist in affection; 
so on the other hand, we ought not to approve of all, as though 
everyone that was religiously affected had true grace, and was 
therein the subject of the saving influences of the Spirit of 
God • • . . 47 
In the sense of urgency that sustained the revival, the evangelistic 
ministry had neglected the need of the newly awakened for disciplined 
instruction and guidance. The "Old Lights," Edwards believed, had mis-
understood the effect conversion would have on natural man when they 
denied that a work of God could be attended by such error. Ironically, 
the revivalists had, at least in practice, fallen into the same error. 
But Edwards did not believe that regenerate man was safe from sin, let 
alone from other errors, and therefore, "the errors and irregularities 
[could] be accounted for, from the consideration of the infirmity and 
weakness and common corruption of mankind, together with the circumstances 
of the work, though we should suppose it to be the work of God." 48 Though 
Edwards defended, and indeed urged, the evangelistic preaching which en-
gaged the affections, he also believed that such preaching should be of 
sound doctrine and truth to engage the other faculties. He warned against 
the increasing practice among revivalists of preaching from supposed 
inspiration rather than careful preparation. Edwards held, with Locke, 
that God operated through common and spiritual influences on man, and 
20 
both influences were to be heeded. The ministry had access to "good 
commentaries and expositions of Scripture and other books of divinity" 
which must be the substance of all preaching. 49 Otherwise, they manipu-
lated the passions of the animal spirits through meaningless noise, 
rather than affecting the mind and heart with the substance and meaning 
of Christian experience. 
By the time the Great Awakening ended, Edwards was under attack from 
both sides. Chauncy and the "Old Lights" had ignored the distinctions 
between true and false affections, seizing instead on his delineations of 
the errors to be guarded against and using them as weapons in their own 
arguments against the revival. And the revivalists, feeling he had 
betrayed them by publicizing such errors, also ignored his warnings and 
continued to exploit emotion at the expense of substance, and momentary 
experience at the expense of lasting effects. Their evangelistic descend-
ants, continuing these abuses, would arrogate Edwards' sermons and his 
descriptions of conversion experiences to themselves, as models for 
manipulating emotion and experience in much the same way. Ironically, 
many hostile historians and critics would seize upon the abuses of the 
evangelists who came after Edwards as evidences of his responsibility for 
the establishment of the evangelistic tradition in America. Edwards had 
been challenged, by Chauncy and the "Old Lights," to defend the thought 
and practice of the revival, a defense that required him to justify his 
beliefs about the nature of man and the means that could best move man to 
religious experience. In the attempt, he admitted that he and others had 
been deluded and in error in their failure to allow for human excess and 
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error, in their failure to foresee where human affections, unguided by 
sound doctrine, would lead. Yet, without those errors and his examina-
tion of them, Edwards' conception of man and experience might have lacked 
the power and the depth he brought to it. In his works Edwards defined 
the Lockean man who, as the subject of the Christian oratory Edwards 
defended and practiced, might be moved to religious experience. 
Chauncy and the "Old Lights" had objected to the affectional basis 
of this Christian oratory, Edwards believed, from confused notions about 
the manner in which the affections depended on the understanding, for 
all affections arose from some apprehension in the understanding. But 
those affections could be either truthful or delusive, and reason, there-
fore, could not deny all affections; it could only judge between them. 
If the immediate perceptions of experience were the purest forms of 
knowledge, then the purest religious experience and knowledge could only 
be through immediate perceptions, through the intuitive simple ideas that 
Locke had described. Only after these ideas became an indwelling princi-
ple of the soul, could reason, using this new foundation, confirm, 
expand, and direct a Christian understanding. For Edwards, "this new 
spiritual sense [was] not a new faculty of understanding, but it [was] a 
new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises 
of the same faculty of understanding."50 He believed, therefore, that a 
Christian oratory could be the means both of bringing man to the attain-
ment of that principle and of directing the applications the understand-
ing made of it. And if man first perceived and acted only as he was 
affected, then that oratory must first engage his affections, though it 
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should not afterward neglect his reason. The errors of the revival had 
not been in the appeal to the affections, but in its failure to direct 
reason to judge between the true and the false. 
It was the minister, as one of God's chief means, who was to lead 
men to experience the precariousness of the position in which their 
natures placed them and to see the insecurity of the defenses they 
erected with their false use of reason. To accomplish this, a minister 
would have to rely on affectional means, since such means could better 
overcome the dangers into which reason had already led: 
When ministers preach of hell and warn sinners to avoid it, in a 
cold manner, though they may say in words that it is infinitely 
terrible; .•. yet they contradict themselves; .•. at the same 
time that such a preacher's words represent the sinner's state as 
infinitely dreadful, his behavior and manner of speaking contra-
dict it •••• 51 
Man's danger had to be presented in a moving manner; if he was to be 
convinced, he had to be affected. Once affected, however, he must be led 
to understand the meaning of his experience and guided in his applica-
tion of it, since a true Christian oratory could not abandon man once he 
was saved. 
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III. OF MAN AND ENDS 
Although the Great Awakening had been, to a large extent, the occa-
sion of Edwards' first confrontation with religious rationalists, the 
issues involved in the revival were not the substance of that confronta-
tion. The "Old Lights" had challenged his view of man and the validity 
of his ministerial practice, but they had not challenged the Calvinistic 
doctrine from which he operated nor the Calvinist goal for which he 
aimed. Chauncy and his supporters were, in Edwards' view, drifting away 
from that doctrine, but that drift was subtle. 52 However, by the time 
Edwards was settled in Stockbridge, following his ouster from the North-
hampton pulpit, 53 Arminian divines had made attacks on such doctrines as 
predestination, original sin, and justification by faith alone. Clyde A. 
Holbrook, in his introduction to the Yale edition of Original Sin, 
asserts that the eighteenth-century controversy over these issues was 
more than "an intramural squabble among theologians," that it was an 
important step in the emerging postulate that man was "a fundamentally 
rational, benevolently inclined individual. "54 The Arminians, as 
Edwards called his opponents, 55 expressed a growing dissatisfaction with 
doctrines that took no notice of a man's character, that left nothing to 
the individual and everything to God. This dissatisfaction took the form 
of concessions that man's freedom of choice and action could influence 
his salvation. As Calvinism and Arminianism squared off, the ensuing 
battle assumed the proportions of dogma face-to-face with rationalism. 
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The rationalists, or Arminians, claimed that such Calvinist doctrines 
as predestination and original sin were no longer tenable, for, if they 
were true, man was incapable of acting as a moral agent who had both 
virtue and vice equally in his power, and who was therefore subject to 
both praise and blame. 56 And if man were not a moral agent, then of what 
use were such means as the gospel and the ministry, with their invita-
tions, exhortations, and commands, since his actions in regard to them 
were foreknown? Unable to accept such a view of man's experience in the 
world, the Arminians "denied •.• that some men were absolutely pre-
destined for heaven while others were absolutely doomed to hell, laying 
down as one of the chief foundations of their argument the principle of 
the freedom of man's will. " 57 They also challenged the Calvinist doc-
trine of original sin, conceding that "as a result of Adam's sin men 
were subject to sorrow, labor, and physical death, but that they were 
not thereby made guilty of sin, nor totally corrupted."58 Man "inherited" 
the conditions and "paid" the debts created by Adam's fall, but was not 
himself depraved be.cause of it. Because the Arminians believed man's 
will was free and his nature uncorrupted, they viewed man's works as a 
factor in determining whether or not he achieved salvation. Though God 
had, following Adam's fall, withdrawn his spiritual image from man, he 
had not thereby condemned him. The Arminians' beliefs put man's struggle 
for salvation back into his own hands. Though God still foreknew, he 
did not fororder; though man lacked a spiritual principle after the Fall, 
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the natural principles of his nature were not inherently corrupt. }~n 
could both seek and find salvation, a possibility that the Arminians 
believed Calvinism denied him. 
During the Great Awakening of the late 1730s and early 1740s, the 
"Old Lights" had challenged the methods of Edwards' ministerial practice. 
Now, in the decade following, the Arminians challenged his thought and 
the ends to which that thought directed his practice. In Religious 
Affections, Edwards had expounded the Lockean psychology of man to 
justify affectional means. To justify the ends toward which such means 
were directed, he had both to destroy the Arminian position and to 
invalidate the attack on his own. And, as in his answer to the accusa-
tions of the "Old Lights," Edwards would operate from a Lockean base. 
The Arminian system rested, Edwards believed, on the concept of the 
Will as an indifferent power. The Arminians viewed the Will as a power 
that was in equilibrium before each act of choice, for only then could 
that act be a free one. Their refutation of original sin and justifica-
tion by faith was an outgrowth of their concept of the Will, since for 
man's destiny to be within his power, his nature and his possibilities 
for action could not be predetermined. The Arminians believed that man, 
in order to act as a moral agent, must have a liberty consisting of three 
things: 
1. . •. a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its 
own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to 
be dependent .•. on any cause without itself . . 2. In-
difference . • . previous to the act of volition . 3. Con-
tingence ... as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and cer-
tain connection with some previous ground or reason of its 
existence. 59 
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To Edwards, this view of liberty was anathema, for he saw clearly that if 
it could be proved, the whole Arminian system would have to be accepted. 
In Freedom of the Will, Edwards attacked the Arminian notions in 
several ways. He began with definition, believing that, as Locke had 
stated, 
One part of these disadvantages in moral ideas, which has made 
them be thought not capable of demonstration, may in a good 
measure be remedied by definitions, setting down that collec-
tion of simple ideas, which every term shall stand for, and 
then using the terms steadily and constantly for that precise 
collection.60 
Edwards believed that the metaphysical debates of his own time and of the 
preceding century had resulted in confused definitions, the result of 
ignoring common meanings and therefore misusing language. The Arminians' 
failure both to define their terms carefully and to recognize the impli-
cations of their definitions was the starting point for Edwards' attack. 
After establishing his own definitions in the opening sections of his 
treatise, he challenged the Arminian notion of the will. Edwards 
accepted Locke's definition of the will as a power rather than an agent, 
but the Arminians had made the will both power and agent when they 
defined it as self-determining. However, Edwards somewhat sarcastically 
asserted that even Arminians could not mean what they seemed to be 
saying: 
But I shall suppose that the Arminians, when they speak of the 
Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the soul willing. 
I shall take it for granted, that when they speak of the Will, 
as the determiner, they mean the soul in the exercise of a power 
of willing, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be 
their meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the 
grossest and plainest absurdity.61 
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The gross and plain absurdity was, in Edwards' view, easily demonstrated, 
for "[i]f the Will determines the Will, then choice orders and determines 
choice."62 Through the reductio ad absurdum technique, Edwards followed 
the determinations of the Will back to a "first" choice which could not 
be a first choice because, according to the Arminian terminology, it in 
turn either had to be chosen by the Will, which demanded yet more 
choice in an endless train, or had to be an act determined outside the 
Will, which therefore could not be a free act. And, as Edwards said, "if 
the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, 
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none of them all can be free." In his view, the Arminians could not 
avoid being brought to that unfree first act if they meant that the Will 
determined itself rather than that the soul, as an agent, determined the 
Will, as a power. 
The Arminian argument for self-determination of the Will, whatever 
was intended by the terms, was an outgrowth of the need to prove man's 
actions were not caused or determined outside himself. To Edwards, such 
a view could only lead to a Godless universe, for 
if it should once be allowed, that things may come to pass without 
a cause, we should not only have no proof of the being of God, but 
we should be without evidence of the existence of anything whatso-
ever, but our own immediately present ideas and consciousness.64 
Only by arguing from effects to causes could man prove the existence of 
anything external to himself. Edwards believed that part of the Arminian 
error lay in a limited view of the term "cause" which included only posi-
tive, productive influence. By Edwards' own definition, "cause" also 
included a conditional, antecedent influence in the nature of "a ground 
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or reason why some things are, rather than others; or why they are as 
they are, rather than otherwise."65 All things that are not self-exis-
tent from eternity came into being from some foundation outside them-
selves. To deny cause in that sense, Edwards said, was to deny "the 
first dictate of common and natural sense" that God had given men; it 
was to deny "the main foundation of all man's reasoning about the 
existence of things "66 Anticipating that the Arminians might 
argue that they did not deny cause for the world at large, that man's 
Will was simply different by nature from other existences, Edwards 
pointed out that the term "by nature" implied a conditional influence 
operating as a cause, thereby invalidating their argument: 
If any should imagine . . . that the free acts of the Will are 
existences of an exceeding different nature from other things; 
by reasons of which they may come into existence without any 
previous ground or reason of it, though other things cannot; 
. • . it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting 
themselves; for they would be giving an account of some ground 
of the existence of a thing, when at the same time they would 
maintain there is no ground of its existence.67 
Thus the Arminians could not argue that the acts of a man's Will were 
uncaused and therefore free from necessity by reason of his nature, for 
they then argued his nature was the cause. 
Edwards believed that the Arminian argument against the doctrine of 
original sin was also the result of a narrow definition of cause. The 
Arminians had argued that man could not be inherently corrupt, since, if 
he were, he could not have accomplished as much good in the world as he 
had. They asserted that the Calvinists had erred in their belief that vice 
prevailed in the world. The Calvinists had looked in all the wrong 
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places, "as if a court of justice was a proper place to make an estimate 
of the morals of mankind."68 The Arminians believed, with George Turn-
bull, the author of a 1740 work on moral philosophy, that 
Upon a fair computation, the fact does indeed come out, that the 
very great villainies have been very uncommon in all ages, and 
looked u9on as monstrous; so general is the sense and esteem of 
virtue.6 
Edwards denied that such a computation would prove man's nature tended to 
good. The Arminians erred in assuming the great villainies of the world 
were the chief record of man's sins. Sin was more than observable viola-
tions of moral law; it was, in Edwards' view, an inward unholiness that 
might or might not reveal itself in outward action. True good could be 
produced only from causes that were, by their nature, holy. The natural 
faculties of man without the spiritual principles were capable only of 
limited and private good. Thus man's self-love might direct him to 
conform to the rules of a society without any conviction that those rules 
were right, and God might cause him to behave properly within limited 
societies such as the family or state, convincing him that such systems 
were right and good. But unless his behavior was caused by a perception 
of the excellence of God's rules, it did not, and could not, escape 
corruption. Real good could come only when God instilled that percep-
tion in man: 
That is to be looked upon as the true tendency of the natural or 
innate disposition of man's heart, which appears to be its 
tendency, when we consider things as they are in themselves, or70 in their own nature, without the interposition of divine grace. 
The evidence of the world did not, therefore, prove that man's nature was 
good, but that God's effective grace was operative in the world. 
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The Arminians had also challenged the Calvinist doctrine of the de-
pravity of man on the grounds that such a view would, in effect, make 
God the author of sin and corruption in the world. But, Edwards said, 
they misunderstood the nature of man before the fall: 
when God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of 
principles. There was an inferior kind, which may be called 
natural, being the principlesofmere human nature; such as 
self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which 
belong to the nature of man, 
Besides these, there were superior principles ... , wherein 
consisted the spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness 
and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the divine 
nature.71 
The spiritual principles were to reign over the natural principles, as 
they did until Adam fell. But, according to Edwards, after Adam fell, 
God withdrew his spiritual principles from Adam, though he left the 
natural principles unchanged. The Arminian view that man's nature was 
changed after Adam's sin, that "something ..• was infused into human 
nature; some quality ••. like a taint, tincture, or infection, altering 
72 the natural constitution, faculties, and dispositions of [men's] souls," 
was therefore in error. The natural principles, without spiritual guid-
ance, could only be directed by man's self-love and his natural appetites, 
and these led man away from God since they were concerned with the body 
rather than the spirit. The possibility for corruption that had been 
present, even in innocence, in the natural principles was realized once 
the spiritual principles were withdrawn. And because men were one with 
Adam, God also withheld the spiritual principles from them as they came 
into existence, "whereby they [came] into the world mere flesh, and 
~--------------------------------------- ------
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entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles; and so 
[became] wholly corrupt as Adam did. " 73 God was therefore not the posi-
tive, productive cause of evil, though his withdrawal created the condi-
tions that allowed evil. 
The Arminians had also challenged the imputation of Adam's sin to 
his descendants, whereby God treated all men as one. This challenge, to 
Edwards, was an attempt to ignore fact, since all the evidence showed 
that God did indeed deal with men as one with Adam, and he would do so 
only "because he looks upon them as one vlith their first father and so 
treats them as sinful and guilty by his apostasy," for even the Arminians 
could not believe that God would treat men as one "without viewing them 
as at all concerned in the affair," yet still subjecting them "to this 
infinitely dreadful calamity." 74 God could, in Edwards' view, treat Adam 
and man as one because all existences from moment to moment depended on 
God's decree governing their constitution. Thus a tree was the same 
existence from seed to mature tree, a man the same existence from infant 
to old man, though substance continually changed: 
A father, according to the course of nature begets a child; an 
oak, according to the course of nature, produces an acorn, or 
a bud; so, according to the course of nature, the former exist-
ence of the trunk of the tree is followed by its new or present 
existence. In the one case and the other, the new effect is 
consequent on the former, only by the established laws and 
settled course of nature, which is • . • nothing but the con-
tinued immediate efficiency of God, according to a constitution 
he has been pleased to establish.75 
All successive new effects, Edwards believed, are treated as one by God 
in creating like properties in them, and likewise man treats external 
existences as one by assigning qualities observed in one thing to other 
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things similar in nature. All things were arbitrarily constituted in the 
sense that all things existed at any given moment through divine will. 
The Arminian objection, said Edwards, supposed "a oneness ..• distinct 
from and prior to any oneness ... founded on divine constitution."76 
But John Taylor, in his 1738 treatise rejecting the doctrine of original 
sin, had himself written, "God, the Original of all Being, is the Only 
77 Cause of all natural effects," and so, Edwards believed, had conceded 
the point before it was argued. Thus man was one with Adam and operated 
in the world without the spiritual principles that could have held him 
from corruption. 
The Arminian arguments against predestination and original sin had 
grown out of a belief that man, in such circumstances, could not act as 
a moral agent, since his actions were then necessarily determined and 
therefore not subject to praise or blame. George Whitby, one of the 
leading Arminians, had said: 
If all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty 
names; we being capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or de-
serveth praise; for who can blame a person for doing only what 
he could not help, or judge that he deserveth praise only for 
what he could not avoid?7 
But, as Edwards said, to deny that actions necessitated by man's nature 
could be praised or blamed was to deny God praise, for God's nature 
necessitated holy actions. The Arminians had erred in assuming that 
their own definitions of action and agency had released man from neces-
sity. They had not eliminated necessity in their own system; they had 
simply failed to recognize it, a fact to which Edwards quickly drew 
attention in his discussion of the Arminian writer Chubb's discussion 
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of action and agency: 
[T]he meaning of the word "action," as Mr. Chubb and others use 
it, is utterly unintelligible and inconsistent, .. because it 
belongs to their notion of an action, that . . . it is under the 
pawer, influence or action of no cause; and yet they hold, 
that the mind's action is the effect of its own determination 
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The Arminian notion of a free act of the will, Edwards said, was self-
contradictory, since it was essential of that act 
that it should be necessary and not necessary; that it should be 
from a cause, and no cause; that it should be the fruit of 
choice and design, and not the fruit of choice and design; that 
it should be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet conse-
quent on previous exertion; that it should be before it is . . . 
Arminianism had attempted to establish man's liberty to act as a moral 
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agent in the concept of a self-determined and indifferent will, operating 
through contingent actions. It had issued a challenge to a Calvinism it 
perceived as denying man moral agency which made all use of means worth-
less, since their effectiveness or lack of it was foreknown. Edwards 
believed, however, that he had shown that the Arminian objections to the 
Calvinist system were "vain and frivolous, being maintained in an incon-
sistence with themselves, and in like manner against their own doctrine, 
as against the doctrines of Calvinism." 81 They had argued a system in 
which a man's works, in all justice, had to be considered in the issue of 
his salvation, yet denied man was corrupted and in need of salvation. 
If, Edwards challenged, man would achieve virtue through works, what need 
was there of Christ and salvation? And if the Arminians admitted a need 
of Christ in salvation, then 
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the argument from justice is given up; for it is to suppose that 
their liableness to misery and ruin comes in a way of justice; 
otherwise there would be no need of the interposition of divine 
grace to save them. 82 
The issue was not whether an undeserving few received grace, but what all 
merited through justice. 
Locke had warned "he that uses words without any clear steady mean-
ing, what does he but lead himself and others into errors."83 The 
Arminians, as Edwards showed, had fallen into this error and provided him 
with a point of attack. Yet the fact that their own system could not 
withstand the very charges they hurled at Calvinism was not proof that 
Calvinism could withstand them. Edwards appeared to have proved that 
the Arminian position was untenable, but had he proved that his own was? 
In defining and defending the Calvinistic system, could he keep his own 
Christian oratory from the logical weaknesses that had made the Arminian 
system vulnerable to attack? 
Since this oratory could operate on man only if he were a moral 
agent, Edwards' first task was to define what man required to be a moral 
agent: 
A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that 
have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good 
or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or 
faulty. To moral agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of 
moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness 
of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which 
an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral in-
ducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and 
reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty.84 
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In order to be a moral agent, then, man required three things: a 
capabity for actions that could be morally judged, an awareness of what 
judgment such action would receive, and a susceptibility to moral per-
suasions. Did Calvinist man possess them? 
The Arminians had asserted that man's actions could be morally 
judged only if his will determined itself, for only then was man free 
from necessity. Though Edwards felt he had successfully refuted that 
notion, he had to prove that man possessed sufficient liberty to be held 
morally responsible in a predestined world. Definition of terms was the 
first step. As James Carse, author of a 1967 critical study of Edwards, 
says, Edwards had learned "that imprecision in the basic presuppositions 
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would bring great confusion into a theological system." In the first 
sections of Freedom of the Will, Edwards had defined the terms necessary 
for his challenge of the Arminian arguments, accusing his opponents of 
various misuses of language. Their first error had been to define the 
Will as a self-determiner, as an agent capable of action. It was an 
error Edwards avoided in his own definition: 
the Will is plainly, that by which the mind chooses anything. 
The faculty of the Will is that faculty or power or principle 
of mind by which it is capable of choosing; an act of the Will 
is the same as an act of choosing or choice.86 
The Will, then, was a power of the mind, not an agent in itself; and as 
a power, it was determined by something outside itself. Locke had asked, 
"what is it that determines the will?" and answered, "The mind." 87 
Edwards answered, "that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the 
88 
mind, is the strongest," The Will, therefore, as a power of the mind, 
36 
was determined by the mind, not by the Will itself. And to ask whether 
the Will was free was, in Locke's words, "the unintelligible question."89 
Edwards, too, saw the question as meaningless: 
to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very 
will itself, is not to speak good sense . . . . That which has 
the power of volition or choice is the man or the soul, and not 
the power of volition itself.90 
Thus, the Arminian notion placing liberty in the will was meaningless. 
The question was the amount of liberty the man, as agent, had. 
The Arminians had placed liberty in indifference. Edwards and Locke 
placed it in man's ability to do as he willed, regardless of the manner 
in which his Will was determined. Man could not refuse to will; there-
fore he could not be indifferent in any action. And to ask if he was 
free to will as he pleased was, for both men, meaningless. Locke be-
lieved that those who made a question of it "must suppose one will to 
determine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on 
d . f' . rr 91 . h d b d d . h' . a 1n 1n1tum, a sent1ment ec oe y E war s 1n 1s argument aga1nst 
the Arminian notion of the self-determined will. The only indifference 
that either Locke or Edwards admitted to their definitions of liberty 
rested in "that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he 
will, or according to his choice,"92 regardless of the cause of that 
choice. As long as man could choose between action and forbearance, both 
93 being in his power to do, he was free. And if he was free to act as he 
chose, he was the proper subject of blame and praise. 
Man was, according to Edwards, himself aware of a desert of praise 
or blame, without regard to his nature: 
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Yea, if it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are im-
planted in the hearts of men by nature itself . . . yet it is 
not commonly supposed that men are worthy of no praise or dis-
praise for such dispositions; although what is natural is un-
doubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the will 
whatsoever.94 
Thus man, in his daily dealings, judged the actions of others without 
viewing their natures as an excuse. Thus man accepted the judgment of 
others with a consciousness that he would judge accordingly if the 
circumstances were reversed, "and thus men's consciences may justify 
God's anger and condemnation."95 Man, therefore, was capable of knowing 
his moral culpability, and since he was, the aim of Christian oratory was 
to move him to a knowledge of his sinfulness in the eyes of God. 
-----------
38 
IV. CHRISTIAN ORATORY 
In answer to the opposition of the "Old Lights" during the Great 
Awakening, and again to the challenges of the Arminians during the debate 
over the Calvinist doctrines of predestination and original sin, Edwards 
had denied the sufficiency of man's natural faculties, reason included, as 
guides to salvation. He had defended the use of an affectional Christian 
oratory as a means of persuasion to bring man to moral action and reli-
gious experience in the struggle to achieve salvation. He had established 
a view of human nature in which man, though naturally corrupt, had moral 
action in his power and was therefore still subject to persuasion and to 
judgment. But if the conversion experience itself was not in man's power 
to bring about, if it were not in response to his works, then what role 
could Christian oratory have in the conversion process? 
During the Awakening, Edwards had seen many religious experiences 
that he viewed as genuine conversions. And though he commented on the 
variety of ways in which conversion experiences occurred, there was an 
apparent pattern in the steps to conversion. The actual conversion ex-
perience, that moment when faith, justification, and salvation met, was 
not in man's power to bring about, but could Christian oratory be the 
guide to move man through the preceding steps to an emotional and reasona-
ble preparedness for conversion if it ever came? Edwards believed that it 
could, that the means God provided in the world were to that end. How 
else could His commands and invitations, as given in the gospel and 
through His ministers, be explained? The fact that man's salvation or 
damnation was foreknown did not rule out God's use of means in preparing 
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man for the infusion of divine grace, for the immediate, perceptual ex-
perience of conversion: 
God makes use of means; but it is not as mediate causes to produce 
this effect. There are not truly any second causes of it; but it 
is produced by God immediately. The word of God is no proper cause 
of this effect; but is made use of only to convey to the mind the 
subject-matter of this saving instruction: And this indeed it doth 
convey to us by natural force or influence.96 
Though such means could not produce the immediate sense of the excellency 
of divine things that Edwards viewed as the moment of conversion, they 
could prepare the mind for that moment and raise the affections of the 
heart in expectation of it. Christian oratory, then, could lead men "to 
do something about their salvation, at least by way of preparation, since 
God, with whom the ultimate initiative lay, had opened the way to him."97 
Edwards was not unaware of the problems that had to be overcome in 
the Christian oratory he proposed, for he had identified the abuses to 
which it was subiect during the Great Awakening and had warned against 
them. Locke had said that words could not excite new simple ideas; 
they could only recall to mind ideas alreadv held , 
because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause no other 
ideas, but their natural sounds: and it is by the custom of using 
them for signs, that they excite and revive in our minds latent 
ideas • • 98 
Edwards agreed with this view, perceiving the special hardships it imposed 
on ministerial and theological concerns. Language, the primary tool for 
moving man to religious experience, was at a particular disadvantage when 
it must convey abstract truths: 
Language is indeed very deficient in regard of terms to express 
precise truth concerning our own minds, and their faculties and 
operations. Words were first formed to express external things; 
and those that are applied to express things internal and 
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40 
spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a sort of figura-
tive sense. Whence they are most of 'em attended with a great 
deal of ambiguity and unfixedness in their signification, occa-
sioning innumerable doubts, difficulties and confusions in in-
quiries and controversies about things of this nature.99 
How was this disadvantage to be overcome in the effort to move man to the 
conviction of his own sinfulness and the danger in which it placed him? 
How could a man be brought to a convincing perception, or experience, of a 
future experience? Edwards believed it was possible only through a de-
scription of the future that equated it with the ideas held in a man's 
mind, through common, daily experiences. As Miller writes: 
If a sermon was to work an effect, it had to impart the sensible 
idea in all immediacy; in the new psychology, it must becomei not 
an astrologer's prediction, but an actual descent into hell. 00 
Though words could never be the sufficient productive cause of saving re-
ligious experience, they could prepare an emotional readiness by estab-
lishing relationships within the mind between ideas already experienced 
and future possibilities. It was to this end that Edwards directed his 
own thought and practice with such power. Though Christian oratory could 
not convey experiential religious truths to man, it could create the con-
ditions in which he might experience those truths and understand them. 
Errors such as the Arminians had fallen into through using words in 
senses divergent from common usage would have to be avoided through careful 
definition. And above all, words were not to be used as sounds without 
substance to raise man's affections, since such affections were to no 
purpose. Only when this error was avoided could language successfully 
create in man an experiential readiness as part of the conversion 
process. 
41 
An experiential readiness for conversion consisted in both natural 
and spiritual knowledge of divine things. Natural knowledge, concerned 
with a rational understanding of doctrine and of God's word, was the 
result of man's natural reason assisted by God's nonsaving means, while 
spiritual knowledge, concerned with a heart-felt sense of the divine 
excellency of doctrine and God's word, was the result of man's natural 
affections. It was, according to Edwards, a minister's responsibility to 
help the members of his congregation to achieve both forms of knowledge. 
These could only be achieved when ministers combined sound doctrine and 
affectional means in their ministry: 
If a minister has light without heat, and entertains his auditory 
with learned discourses, without a savor of the power of godli-
ness, or any appearance of fervency of spirit, and zeal for God 
and the good of souls, he may gratify itching ears, and fill the 
heads of his people with empty notions; but it will not be likely 
to reach their hearts, or save their souls. And if, on the other 
hand, he be driven on with a fierce and intemperate zeal, and 
vehement heat, without light, he will be likely to kindle the 
like unhallowed flame in his people, and to fire their corrupt 
passions and affections; but will make them never the better, 
nor lead them a step towards heaven, but drive them apace the 
other way. 101 
Edwards combined both heat and light in his labors with his own congrega-
tion, believing that he must both engage the affections of his parishio-
ners and guide their rational understanding in order to lead them through 
the steps of the conversion process. 
The first step Edwards identified in the conversion process was the 
need for man to come to an utter conviction of his own hopeless and im-
mense sinfulness: 
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when the minds of sinners are affected with some concern for their 
souls, and they are stirred up to seek their salvation[,] [n]othing 
is more necessary for men • • . than thorough conviction and 
humiliation; than that their consciences should be properly con-
vinced of their real guilt and sinfulness in the sight of God and 
their deserving of wrath.l02 
It was at this step that the reasoning of the "Old Rights" and the 
Arminians posed the greatest threat to man's salvation. The "Old Lights" 
argued that man's natural reason was uncorrupted and could guide man to 
salvation. The Arminians argued that man was not inherently corrupt, that 
if free, he could do good in the world, but if necessitated, his actions 
were not subject to moral judgment. Thus encouraged. man was only too prone 
to excuse his conduct and endan~er his salvation: 
It is of great importance, that they, that are seeking their own 
salvation, should be brought off from all dependence on their own 
righteousness: but these notions above all prevent it. They 
justify themselves, in the sincerity of their endeavors. They 
say to themselves that they do what they can; they take great 
pains; and though there be great imperfection in what they do, 
yet these they cannot help: here moral necessity, or inability, 
comes in as an excuse.l03 
Reasoning such as the Arminians offered served men ill, for it became 
"their stronghold, their sheet-anchor," against all exhortations to recog-
nize their sinfulness.l04 Man had to be brought away from the 
false reasoning by which he had judged himself secure to an affective 
perception that he stood in danger. 
Man had, first of all, to recognize that his sinfulness, though in-
herent was his own; his failure to live by the law to which God commanded 
him was not excusable. Though he might accomplish some good through God's 
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intervention, God was not obliged to intervene: 
It is unreasonable to suppose, that God should be obliged, if he 
makes a reasonable creature capable of knowing his will, and re-
ceiving a law from him, and being subject to his moral govern-
ment, at the same time to make it impossible for him to sin, or 
break his law. lOS 
And he had to recognize that he was the author of that sin, rather than 
resorting to the Arminian argument that God was the author of sin because 
He withdrew his influences: 
It would be strange arguing indeed, because men never commit sin, 
but only when God leaves 'em to themselves, and necessarily sin, 
when he does so, that therefore their sin is not from themselves, 
but from God; and so, that God must be a sinful being . 106 
Man had to recognize that he had not restrained himself from sin except as 
God's influences had restrained him: 
The corruption of the heart of man is immoderate and boundless in 
its fury; and while wicked men live here, it is like fire pent up 
by God's restraints, whereas if it were let loose, it would set 
on fire the course of nature; and as the heart is now a sink of 
sin, so if sin was not restrained, it would immediately turn the 
soul into a fiery oven, or a furnace of fire and brimstone.l07 
Only when such false comforts were removed could man be moved to the emo-
tional conviction that he stood in need of salvation, for otherwise he 
minimized the sinfulness to which Edwards sought to awaken him: 
Doth it seem to thee not real that thou shalt suffer such a dread-
ful destruction, because it seems to thee thou dost not deserve 
it? And because thou dost not see anything so horrid in thyself, 
as to answer such a dreadful punishment? Why is it that thy 
wickedness doth not seem bad enough to deserve this punishment?l08 
Man deceived himself if he believed his sins were small, for all sins kept 
man from a justification by works, which demanded total obedience to God's 
law. And justification by faith required man to recognize his failure to 
live by that law. "How," demanded Edwards, "can you be willing to have 
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Christ for a Savior from a desert of hell, if you be not sensible that 
109 you have a desert of hell?" 
It was at this point in the conversion process, where man could be 
brought to realize his sinfulness and his danger, that Edwards' affec-
tional oratory was at its most powerful. He strove to create in his 
hearers an intuitional perception of what awaited the unconverted by 
recalling common experiences to .their minds and investing those experi-
ences with spiritual implications: 
We find it easy to tread on and crush a worm that we see crawling 
on the earth; so it is easy for us to cut and singe a slender 
thread that anything hangs by; thus easy is it for God, when he 
pleases to cast his enemies down to hell.110 
Thus Edwards, in portraying man's precarious position, sought to engender 
in his hearers the emotions involved in any situation of imminent danger 
and establish a relevance to spiritual danger: 
0 sinner! Consider the fearful danger you are in: it is a great 
furnace of wrath, a wide and bottomless pit, full of the fire of 
wrath, that you are held over in the hand of that God, whose 
wrath is provoked and incensed as much against you, as against 
many of the damned in hell. You hang by a slender thread, with 
the flames of divine wrath flashing about it, and ready every 
moment to singe it, and burn it asunder; and you have no interest 
in any Mediator, and nothing to lay hold of to save yourself, 
nothing to keep off the flames of wrath, nothing of your own, 
nothing you have ever done, nothing that you can do, to induce 
God to spare you one moment.lll 
Edwards' words were calculated to make man experience the helplessness 
and hopelessness of such a position in the face of God's wrath, which was 
portrayed as constantly increasing until it reached that moment when it 
poured out on the sinner: 
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The wrath of God is like great waters that are dammed for the 
present; they increase more and more, and rise higher and higher, 
till an outlet is given; and the longer the stream is stopped, 
the more rapid and mighty is its course, when once it is let 
loose. It is true, that judgment against your evil work has 
not been executed hitherto; the floods of God's vengeance have 
been withheld; but your guilt in the meantime is constantly 
increasing, and you are every day treasuring up more wrath; the 
waters are continually rising, and waxing more and more mighty; 
and there is nothing but the mere pleasure of God, that holds 
the waters back, that are unwilling to be stopped, and press 
hard to go forward. If God should only withdraw his hand from 
the floodgate, it would immediately fly open, and the fiery 
floods of the fierceness and wrath of God, would rush forth 
with inconceivable fury, and would come upon you with omnipotent 
power; and if your strength were ten thousand times greater than 
it is, yea, ten thousand times greater than the strength of the 
stoutest, sturdiest devil in hell, it would be nothing to with-
stand and endure it.ll2 
Man faced death and damnation every minute, for "the bow of God's wrath" 
was drawn, the arrow aimed, and it was nothing but God's pleasure that 
kept the arrow "from being made drunk" with man's blood. 113 Edwards 
warned man that he could count on neither time nor any plans of his own 
to escape the impending wrath, and put into words the hopeless excuses 
man would make when time and plans at last failed. If living man could 
ask those who had gone to hell whether they had expected that end to 
their planning, Edwards said, they would answer: 
'No, I never intended to come here: I had laid out matters other-
wise in my mind; I thought I should contrive well for myself: I 
thought my scheme good: I intended to take effectual care; but 
it came upon me unexpectedly; I did not look for it at that time, 
and in that manner; it came as a thief: death outwitted me: God's 
wrath was too quick for me: 0 my cursed foolishness!'114 
Man could not expect to escape hell through any contrivances of his own, 
for his wickedness made him "heavy as lead," and pulled him ever toward 
hell, where his contrivances would no more stop his plunge than "a 
46 
spider's web would ••• stop a falling rock." 115 Nor could man hope to 
bear that wrath when it came, however well he might bear the pains of an 
earthly world: 
what will it signify for a worm, which is about to be pressed 
under the weight of some great rock, to be let fall with its 
whole weight upon it, to collect its strength, to set itself to 
bear up the weight of the rock, and to preserve itself from being 
crushed by it?ll6 
Man could have no hopes of bearing the torments of hell, for "it [was] in 
vain to set the briers and thorns in battle array against glowing flames; 
the points of thorns, though sharp, do nothing to withstand the fire." 117 
Again in vivid imagery related to everyday experience, Edwards portrayed 
the torments of hell as beyond any man's capacity to face courageously: 
We can conceive but little of the matter; we cannot conceive 
what that sinking of the soul in such a case is. But to help 
your conception, imagine yourself to be cast into a fiery oven, 
all of a glowing heat, or into the midst of a glowing brick-
kiln, or of a great furnace, where your pain would be as much 
greater than that occasioned by accidentally touching a coal 
of fire, as the heat is greater. Imagine also that your body 
were to be there for a quarter of an hour • • • ; how long 
would that quarter hour seem to you! • • • But what would be 
the effect on your soul, if you knew you must lie there 
enduring that torment for twenty-four hours! And how much 
greater would be the effect if you knew you must endure it 
for a thousand years! .•• and that you never, never should 
be delivered!ll8 
Edwards knew that an eternity of torments was impossible for man to com-
pletely comprehend, but man was capable of enough comprehension to under-
stand the despair such an eternity would involve: 
How dismal will it be when you are under these raging torments, 
to know assuredly that you never, never shall be delivered 
from them; to have no hope: when you shall wish that you might 
but be turned into nothing, but shall have no hope of it; when 
you shall wish that you might be turned into a toad or a 
serpent, but shall have no hope of it .•.• 119 
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It was only through such vivid imagery that Edwards believed man cou'ld 
be moved to an emotional conviction of his sinfulness and the dangers in 
which it placed him, although sound doctrine was also required to make 
that conviction a lasting one. Once convinced, however, man could then 
move to the next step of the conversion process. 
Once a man was convinced he deserved damnation, his mind was pre-
pared to seek a genuine salvation, and he was to be urged to make use of 
the means available to him, for the time was coming, and would soon come, 
when he would pass out of time into eternity; "and so [would] pass from 
120 
under all means of grace whatsoever." Nor was he to question the 
efficiency of means, for what man was commanded to do was within his 
power to do, if he willed to do it. "Persons ought to be so resolved for 
heaven," said Edwards, "that if by any means they can obtain, they will 
b . " dl f h . d 121 o ta1n, regar ess o t e means requ1re • Man was concerned in his 
worldly affairs with providing for the future, seizing opportunities, and 
securing gains he had already made. These same concerns could also be 
applied man's spiritual life where God had provided even greater means of 
success than were available in the worldly life, these means being 
nothing less, said Edwards, "then the abundant instruction of perfect and 
divine wisdom itself."122 Edwards urged his hearers to make use of such 
means in their struggle for salvation, for only if they sought, could 
they prepare themselves to receive: 
Such a manner of seeking is needful to prepare for the kingdom of 
God. Such earnestness and thoroughness of endeavors, is the 
ordinary means that God makes use of to bring persons to an 
acquaintance with themselves, to a sight of their own hearts, to 
a sense of their own helplessness, and to a despair in their own 
strength and righteousness.l23 
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Man could not argue that the search was useless, or even that it was too 
difficult, for "if ••• no difficulties attended seeking salvation, 
there would be no occasion for striving, a man would have nothing to 
. b 11 124 strl.ve a out. In Edwards' view, though man's struggle to achieve 
salvation on his own, without God's intervention, was hopeless, in the 
struggle man gained more knowledge of his insufficient nature, and 
would be therefore more responsive to the chance of salvation if it came 
because he no longer would depend on himself. Thus man did not declare 
God's. perfections and omnipotence and his own unworthiness in order to 
prevail upon God for mercy, but to affect his own heart with these 
truths and thus be prepared to receive mercy if it were offered. If he 
should not be granted grace, man had to be prepared to acknowledge the 
justice of his own damnation, but Edwards believed the struggle for 
salvation itself was necessary. God's ordinary method was "to give grace 
to those that are much concerned about it, and earnestly and for a 
h i 11 125 considerable time seek it or continue to do t ings in order to t. 
Man could only near the moment of immediate perception that was conver-
sion through seeking it, though that moment might never come. 
Edwards believed that man had to be urged to seek salvation, to be 
convinced that it was necessary. And again, conviction had to be brought 
about by vividly establishing relationships between experiences already 
present in the mind and spiritual realities. Man had to realize that 
seeking God was his primary goal in life: 
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All other ends of man are subordinate to this. There are 
inferior ends for which man was made. Men were made for one 
another; made for their friends and neighbors, and for the 
good of the public. But all these inferior ends are designed 
to be subordinate to the higher end of glorifying God; and 
therefore man may not be actively useful, or actively answer 
any purpose, otherwise than by actively glorifying God, or 
bringing forth fruit to God.l26 
Man, without God, was empty, a point Edwards made in the image of an 
uninhabited house: 
The subordinate end of the underpinning of a house is to 
support the house; and the subordinate end of the windows is 
to let in the light. But the ultimate end of the whole is 
the benefit of the inhabitants. Therefore, if the house be 
never inhabited, the whole is in vain.l27 
Man without God was useless, as Edwards pointed out in another image: 
As in a clock one wheel moves another, and that another, till 
at last the motion comes to the hand and hammer, which immedi-
ately respect the eye and the ear, otherwise all the motions 
are in vain.l28 
Man was made to be useful to other men, to his family and to his communi-
ties, but first of all to God. His whole use was "to bring glory to God 
the maker, or all else [was] in vain; and however a man [might] serve 
among his fellow creatures, in a private or public capacity, upon the 
whole he [was] in vain."129 However, man had to realize that seeking 
salvation would not be easy, since it would also be a struggle against 
man's sinful inclinations and interests: 
The way to heaven is ascending; we must be content to travel 
up hill, though it be hard and tiresome, though it be contrary 
to the natural tendency and bias of our flesh that tends down 
to earth.l30 
He had also to realize that his lifetime would be a never-ending process 
of seeking the influences of salvation in his life: 
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We ought to travel on in this way with assiduity. It ought 
to be the work of every day to travel on towards heaven • . 
As he that is on a journey is often thinking on the place 
that he is going to and it is his care and business every day 
to get along; to improve his time, to get towards his journey's 
end. He spends the day in it; it is the work of the day, 
whilst the sun serves him.l31 
The man who believed his seeking was at an end was "in a great measure 
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satisfied and quieted with his own works and performances." But the 
man who continued to seek grew in self-knowledge, which Edwards believed 
was the reason God commanded man to seek salvation: 
In this way persons gain much more knowledge of themselves, and 
acquaintance with their own hearts, than in a negligent, slight 
way of seeking; for they have a great deal more experience of 
themselves. It is experience of ourselves, and finding what we 
are, that God commonly makes use of means of bringing us off 
from all dependence on ourselves. But men never get acquaintance 
with themselves so fast, as in the most earnest way of seeking.l33 
As man grew in knowledge of himself, he learned that he could have no 
hope in his own abilities; his only hope res ted in God's grace. God 
alone "could take him out of the miry clay and horrible pit [and] set 
134 him upon a rock." Edwards believed that a persevering search for 
salvation was, to some extent at least, attractive of God's grace, 
though not because the search itself was meritorious, since it must fall 
far short of the perfect obedience justification by works required. 
Conversion, Edwards believed, was an immediate, intuitional percep-
tion of God's divine excellence, quite apart from any good man might 
expect. It was this perception that constituted the faith by which man 
was justified, for it was an acceptance of the divine plan of salvation 
as offered through Christ without man's considering his personal interest 
in it. Edwards chose to portray this experience to his parishioners in 
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the familiar terms of Adam's experience. As Adam's sin had been imputed 
to man, so would man's sin be imputed to Christ, and Christ's death would 
pay for man's sins. As Adam's sin was imputed to man, so would Christ's 
goodness be imputed to man, and Christ's goodness would justify him. 
Faith was man's acceptance of Christ, an acceptance that Edwards por-
trayed in the image of a marriage union: 
we are not united to Christ as a reward of our faith, but have 
union with him by faith, only as faith is the very act of 
uniting or closing on our part. As when a man offers himself 
to a woman in marriage, he does not give himself to her as a 
reward of her receiving him in marriage: her receiving him 
is not considered as a worthy deed in her, for which he rewards 
her by giving himself to her; but it is by her receiving him 
that the union is made, by which she hath him for her husdand: 
it is on her part the unition itself.l35 
Man was justified by faith as he was, by that act of faith, one with 
Christ and therefore deserving of salvation through Christ's works and 
perfections. Yet the moment of conversion, the immediate intuitional 
perception of the true meaning of Christ's offer and the acceptance of 
that offer, did not release the new "saint" from his human nature, 
against which he must still struggle. 
Once man experienced conversion, according to Edwards, he could not 
give up seeking God's influences, though his focus changed. The oratory 
Edwards proposed must then guide man's understanding, for though he had 
received a new spiritual principle to guide him, he still had to struggle 
against his corrupt nature: 
a Christian's life may be attended with many and exceeding great 
imperfections, and yet be a holy life, or a truly Christian life. 
It may be such a life as to clearly and even necessarily show, 
that the grace which the individual has, is of the kind which has 
a tendency to holy practice.136 
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If the conversion-experience a man attested to were genuine, that 
genuineness would reveal itself in Christian practice. Though the new 
"saint" might fall into error, a Christian oratory and his own awareness 
of his infirmities would guide him back to true Christian behavior. 
Christ's influences were a new principle of the "saint's" being and 
could not but affect every facet of his life: 
the sap of the true vine is not only conveyed into them, as the 
sap of a tree may be conveyed into a vessel, but is conveyed as 
sap is from a tree into one of its living branches, where it be-
comes principle of life. The Spirit of God being thus com-
municated and united to the saints, they are from thence 
••• called spiritual.137 
True conversion would, therefore, be visible in regenerate man's actions, 
though weakly at first. But as the new "saint" grew in Christian 
knowledge through making use of the means available to him in God's word, 
in the church and its ministers, and in the new spiritual principle 
directing the use of his natural faculties, his Christian practice would 
increasingly reveal his inward holiness. 
As Edwards attempted to guide his parishioners through the conver-
sion process, he strove to vivify experience through the force of his 
language. His sermons, and to some extent his theological writings, 
reveal his constant concern with expressing ideas that relied on reason 
and sound doctrine in such a way as to touch on the experiences of his 
auditors and awaken the responses those experiences created. Edwards 
described and practiced a Christian oratory, and in the 
process defined man and themeans and ends of that oratory. He thus 
answered the questions critics such as Aldridge, quoted earlier, and 
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opponents had posed: why should man struggle for salvation in the 
Calvinist world, where the outcome of that struggle is known before it 
begins? Because, says Edwards, the struggle is necessary in order for 
man to know himself and his place in the world, and that knowledge is 
necessary if there is a possibility that he is to be saved. Though man's 
works could not gain him consideration with God, his struggles could 
bring him to realize the insufficiency of his own efforts and the 
necessity of Christ's sacrifice and therefore prepare him to receive 
grace if it came. His struggle did not, of course, guarantee him salva-
tion, which was offered only by God's free choice. Why should man be 
exhorted to strive since his response to such exhortations was foreknown? 
Because, said Edwards, God's foreknowledge did ~ot produce the effect. 
Man's response was in his own power. God knew what his choice would be 
because all time was visible to God, but to foreknow was not to compel or 
direct that response. Why should man struggle when to struggle did not 
guarantee success? Because, said Edwards, not to struggle was to guaran-
tee failure. And though God did not necessarily give grace to any one 
who struggled, it was in his power to do so if he chose. 
In the end, Edwards believed, the Calvinist doctrines he defended 
came closer to the reality of experience than the systems his opponents 
had proposed. Man recognized causal relationships in nature and in 
society. He could not then exempt himself from those relationships and 
still believe in God's design in the external universe, a universe that 
would therefore depend upon his and other men's free acts of will. And 
if the world were contingent on his actions, then God could have no end 
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in view for his creation, since to have an end in view would imply, at 
the least, foreknowledge if not foreordering. And, in a foreknown world, 
man's actions were as certain as in a foreordered one, unless God's fore-
knowledge could be in error. But however certain his actions in God's 
view, man himself considered and made choices; his own nature determined 
those choices and was the cause of his sinful actions. Man, therefore, 
was subject to praise and blame. 
Because man could act as he chose, he was the proper subject of a 
Christian oratory that could guide him to a self knowledge by which he 
could begin to change his nature. Common means were also available to 
this end in the laws of society, the church, and most importantly, in 
God's word. The Lockean man Edwards described was open to such means 
through sensation and reflection. Once man experienced conversion, those 
sensations and reflections would be guided by spiritual principles. 
Edwards had constructed a Christian oratory in answer to the challenges 
posed by views of man held by the "Old Lights" and the Arminians. He 
described and defended a view that placed Lockean man squarely within the 
Calvinist world as the subject on whom that oratory would operate in 
moving him to seek his own salvation. During the Great Awakening, he had 
defended the use of affectional means to move man, and in response to the 
Arminian challenge, he had defended the use of means in a foreknown 
world. In so doing, he had described a conversion process that utilized 
the best science and philosophy of his day while defending a theology 
that was becoming outmoded. But, though he accepted the Calvinist 
theology, he was not content with its traditional professions. He tested 
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each for evidence of its accord with reality and then redefined it in the 
terminology of Locke. For his efforts he found himself attacked from all 
sides. The traditionalists attacked him for participating in, and de-
fending, the Awakening. The revivalists attacked him for challenging 
the excesses of the revivals. The Arminians attacked him for attempting 
to reinstate the Calvinist doctrines that the churches were either 
mitigating or abandoning. And eventually his congregation expelled him 
from his pulpit for attempting to reinstate traditional practices. In 
his own time Edwards was forever at the center of controversy. 
He had, in his examinations of the nature of man and man's experi-
ence, operated from a Calvinist base that is, today, in disrepute because 
of its harsh view of man and his limited possibilities. America turned 
away from that view to a belief in the limitless possibilities of the 
individual, and Edwards is often condemned for failing to read the temper 
of his times. Yet Edwards did not deny the importance of the individual. 
Though he believed that man could accomplish good only with God's help, 
he believed man could be brought to accept that help. He focused his 
oratory on moving the individual to a perception of the true nature of 
that help and ofhis own need of it. Although Edwards oratory was the 
tool of his Calvinist ministry, his definition of man as its subject and 
language as its chief tool went beyond the Calvinism of his theology. 
It was no longer the established Calvinist doctrines of original sin and 
predestination, based on dogma and Scripture, that future ages would have 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------~----
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to accept, adapt, or refute, but Edwards' examinations of the 
nature of man and his reasons and capabilities for action in the world 
and for spiritual regeneration. 
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